EN · DE Request an offer

Pentests & red teaming by cyber security freelancers

Security starts here.
We find the vulnerabilities before attackers do.

Manual penetration tests, red teaming and source code audits by a team of cyber security freelancers with more than two decades of offensive security experience.

Every engagement includes

  • Agreed scope and rules of engagement, in writing
  • Manual testing by experienced analysts
  • Verified findings with risk ratings
  • Clear report with remediation advice, in English or German
  • Retest of your fixes on request
Founded by the creators of Nullsecurity BlackArch Linux
20+ years of offensive securityReports in English & GermanPGP-encrypted communication
Approach

A clear process, from first call to verified fix

Transparent steps and written agreements, so you always know what happens next.

1

Scoping

Objectives, rules of engagement and time frame, agreed in writing.

2

Testing

Hands-on testing by experienced analysts, supported by tools.

3

Reporting

Management summary, reproducible findings and remediation advice.

4

Retest

On request, we verify your fixes and update the report.

About

Researchers who test, and testers who research

Dynamic as a freelancer, united as a team.

Nullsecurity Labs was founded by the creators of Nullsecurity and BlackArch Linux. Our analysts work as freelancers in a team: they build security tools, share their knowledge and follow common quality standards, so you get specialist depth with consistent results.

Meet the team

Manual depth

We chain vulnerabilities like real attackers instead of forwarding scanner output.

Research background

Creators of BlackArch Linux and numerous open-source security tools.

Actionable reports

Prioritised findings with concrete remediation, in English or German.

Discretion

Confidential handling of your data and encrypted communication.

From the field

How single vulnerabilities become a complete attack

Anonymised attack paths from our projects, step by step, and what helped against them.

Internal penetration test

From the office network to domain admin

Starting point: a test machine in the office network, without any credentials.

  1. Captured credentials

    Legacy name resolution (LLMNR) made machines send login hashes to the test machine.

  2. Weak password

    The hash of a service account could be cracked offline.

  3. Admin on many servers

    The service account was local administrator on numerous servers; one of them held the credentials of a domain admin in memory.

  4. Domain admin

    Full control over every system in the domain.

What helped: LLMNR and NBT-NS disabled, long random passwords for service accounts, admin tiering and LAPS for the local administrator passwords.

Web application penetration test

From one customer account to all customer data

Starting point: a regular test account in a customer portal.

  1. Predictable IDs

    Invoices were loaded by sequential numbers.

  2. Missing access control

    The server did not check whom an invoice belonged to: other numbers returned the invoices of other customers (IDOR).

  3. Admin function

    An administrative API function only checked that a user was logged in, not their role.

  4. All customer data

    Read and write access to the data of every customer.

What helped: authorisation checks for every object and every function on the server; the retest confirmed the fixes.

Cloud security test

From a public bucket to the cloud account

Starting point: only the company name, no access.

  1. Public bucket

    A storage bucket with build artefacts could be read without authentication.

  2. Key in the artefact

    A deployment package contained a valid access key.

  3. Permissions too broad

    The key was allowed to change IAM policies, including its own.

  4. Account administrator

    Full control over the cloud account.

What helped: bucket made private, key rotated and replaced by roles, least-privilege permissions and secret scanning in the build pipeline.

Scenario based audit

From a phone call to remote access

Starting point: an agreed scenario, only public information.

  1. Research

    Names, roles and phone numbers from public sources such as the company website and career portals.

  2. Call to the help desk

    The analysts posed as an employee with a new phone and asked for a password and MFA reset.

  3. Reset without checks

    The help desk reset both without reliably verifying the caller.

  4. Remote access

    Login to VPN and email with the employee’s account.

What helped: mandatory call-back to a registered number, approval of MFA resets by a manager and training for the help desk.

Publications

Research from our team

Tools, papers and advisories from our research.

Contact

Let’s talk about your security

Tell us what you would like to have tested, and we will get back to you with an offer.

Email
PGP key (fingerprint)4D24 E9B9 2E72 5D66 20DE F1F7 3745 E011 35F1 4F38
Send an email
@nullseclabs

Follow us on X for more information and current topics.